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ABSTRACT
Based on an analysis of 22 European far-right parties, we identify an emergent 
discourse in environmental politics, which we conceptualise as ‘ecobordering’. 
This discourse seeks to blame immigration for national environmental degrada-
tion, which draws on colonial and racialised imaginaries of nature in order to 
rationalise further border restrictions and ‘protect’ the ‘nativist stewardship’ of 
national nature. As such, ecobordering seeks to obscure the primary driving 
causes of the ecological crisis in the entrenched production and consumption 
practices of Global North economies, whilst simultaneously shifting blame on to 
migration from the Global South where ecological degradation has been most 
profound. In an era of increasing climate migration, ecobordering thereby 
portrays effects as causes and further normalises racist border practices and 
colonial amnesia within Europe.
KEYWORDS Borders; anti-immigration; far right parties; environmental protection; climate denialism; 
climate migration
Introduction
Competing political discourses seek to shape the public understanding of the 
environmental crisis and appropriate strategies for its resolution, with each 
discourse purveyed by distinctive but evolving political factions (McCright 
et al. 2016, Farstad 2018, Cann and Raymond 2018). Far-right parties, 
a longstanding force of anti-immigrationism and xenophobia in European 
politics, have traditionally sought to disavow the science of (or responsibility 
for) ecological degradation – presenting it as a conspiracy designed to benefit 
‘globalist elites’ or undermine national sovereignty via multilateral agree-
ments – or marginalise the issue entirely (Mudde 2007, Albertazzi and 
McDonnell 2008, Gemenis et al. 2012, Lockwood 2018, Schaller and Carius 
2019). However, our inter-textual analysis (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989) of 
manifestos, press releases, websites, speeches, interviews, blogs and election 
pamphlets of 22 European far-right parties1 (henceforth EFRPs) that sat in 
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the European Parliament between May 2014 and September 2019 reveals 
a significant discursive shift. EFRPs have recently reified a distinctive new 
environmental discourse which we conceptualise as ‘ecobordering’.
Ecobordering casts immigration (of which migration from the Global 
South is made hyper-visible) as a threat to the local or national environment 
and consequently presents borders as forms of environmental protection. 
Ecobordering can take the form of stoking fears that immigration will 
Figure 1. 
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deplete national ecological resources (land, water, food, etc.) and exacerbate 
local environmental issues – which we term migration as environmental 
plunder. Or ecobordering can depict migrants as environmentally irrespon-
sible ‘hordes’ with no aptitude for managing natural resources (unlike 
‘native’ custodians) supposedly due to an absence of ‘belonging’ to or 
‘investment’ in a local area – which we term migrant as environmental 
vandal. Relying on fallacious depictions of migrants, an ignorance of the 
material economic drivers of ecological degradation, and a narrow focus on 
‘national’ nature, ecobordering seeks to encourage reactionary nationalistic 
responses to the environmental crisis. The purpose, ultimately, is to ratio-
nalise the securitisation of regional, national, and property borders in the 
name of environmental protection. The border practices subject to ‘green-
washing’ include visa restrictions, military operations in the Mediterranean 
Sea, refugee camps, reducing rights to asylum, and coercive integration 
strategies. As the spokesperson of Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, Jordan 
Bardella, declared in April 2019 ‘borders are the environment’s greatest 
ally . . . it is through them that we will save the planet’ (France24 2019).
The rising popularity and influence of the European far-right and the 
increasing valence of the environmental crisis to European electorates ren-
ders this a vital topic. Our identification and conceptualisation of ecoborder-
ing firstly serves as a corrective to the dominant perception that climate 
change denialism is the primary environmental discourse of EFRPs 
(Gemenis et al. 2012, Lockwood 2018, Schaller and Carius 2019, Forchtner 
2019a). The turn to a selective and invidious approach to ecological issues by 
EFRPs is designed to weaponise environmental issues to bolster anti- 
immigration agendas, which demonstrates the renewed significance of 
ethno-nationalism and border security in environmental politics (De 
Genova 2018, Rodrigeuz 2018). Secondly, our analysis of ecobordering con-
tributes to the limited recognition of the role played by environmental 
politics in border regimes, which is scarcely developed in the European 
context (Baldwin 2013, Hultgren 2015, Hultgren and Stevis 2020).
Ecobordering is not exclusively propounded by EFRPs, and has wider 
resonance with conservative and liberal projects.2 However, as the far-right is 
both ascendant in Europe and has historically served the dangerous function 
of normalising far-right discourse into more mainstream public debates 
(Valluvan 2019), it remains worthy of particular scholarly attention. We 
provide a systematic analysis of EFRP rhetoric and electioneering which 
reveals the character and argumentative structure of ecobordering and its 
racialised, gendered, and classed logics. Tacitly repudiating the role of 
destructive economic forces in generating ecological degradation, ecoborder-
ing serves to rationalise border restrictions and violence in the midst of 
increasing climate migration. By analysing ecobordering as a discourse, we 
are attentive to the role played by discursive framings in rendering issues 
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intelligible, (re)producing forms of social meaning, and shaping political and 
material outcomes (Blyth 2002, Schmidt 2010, Hay 2011). However, we treat 
these discursive formations as produced through historical relations of 
power, constituted within broader colonial and capitalist ideologies and 
structures (Quijano 2007). In doing so, the empirical findings and conceptual 
development of ecobordering drew on existing work on postcolonial 
approaches to borders (Bhambra 2017, Rodrigeuz 2018, Mayblin and 
Turner 2020), materialist analyses of climate change (Koch 2012, Newell 
2013, Moore 2016), and racialised environmentalism (Hultgren 2015, Pulido 
2017).
We will firstly explore the historical genesis of ecobordering. Second, we 
offer an empirical account of ecobordering as an emerging discourse 
amongst EFRPs. Third, we analyse how ecobordering reworks and sanitises 
colonial and eco-fascist logics of race whilst obscuring the capitalist processes 
underpinning ecological degradation in order to formulate a discourse 
designed to engender fears around human mobility. In doing so, we inter-
rogate the political implications of ecobordering for anti-immigration poli-
tics, European statecraft, and the ecological crisis.
The origins of ecobordering
Ecobordering represents the consolidation and sanitisation of a constellation 
of 19th and 20th century Malthusian, conservative, and eco-fascist ideas, as 
well as Romantic-era notions of nature and belonging, formed into 
a relatively coherent discourse and electoral strategy. Ecobordering reworks 
these imaginaries to present Global South migrants as active threats to 
environmental sustainability in order to ‘greenwash’ anti-immigration poli-
cies at a time of growing climate migration.
There is no culturally or politically objective idea of nature or environ-
ment. The imagined separation of nature and humanity since the 
Enlightenment has allowed the former to become seen as a site of extraction 
and exploitation for the ‘progress’ of the latter. Modern European concep-
tions of nature have become deeply entwined with the capitalist calculations 
of the earth’s resources and conceptions of ‘sound’ resource management, as 
well as appeals to ‘national essence’ (Huggan and Tiffin 2007, Parasram and 
Tilley 2018). These understandings of nature has underpinned the erosion of 
communal land rights, the private property laws of the enclosure movement, 
and the emergence of capitalist class relations (Federici 2004). Central to 
these developments was contestation over which members of society could, 
or could not, be entrusted with efficiently using and managing natural 
resources.
One of the most explicit early fusion of environmental management and 
private property rights can be found in the writings of Edmund Burke, who 
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believed that only those who ‘belonged’ to, and were ‘invested’ in, a plot of 
land (or ‘little platoon’ to use his phrase) could be trusted to be stewards or 
custodians of it (Burke 2009 [1790], Scruton 2012). Notions of investment 
and belonging, conflated with private property rights and capitalist class 
relations, were seen as key to systems of localised environmental protection.
Conservative and emergent nationalist ideologies fetishised the fusion of 
nativism and nature, which cast pastoral labour and agrarianism as exemp-
lary of ‘rooted’ national character (from the English Yeoman, to the Spanish 
Peasant). At its most extreme, these configurations have underpinned an 
embodied appeal to ‘blood and soil’ (Valluvan 2019). This fetishisation of 
‘blood and soil’, private property, and the nuclear family would arguably 
reach its zenith in the Nazis’ appeal to the farmer as exemplary of white, 
Christian, Germanic ‘volk’.
The racialised, gendered, and class dynamics of colonialism were funda-
mental to shaping the construction of nature and environmental manage-
ment. Projects of settler colonialism in North America, for example, 
propagated an imaginary of the ‘New World’ as a pristine and ‘empty’ 
wilderness, which was used to rationalise the dispossession of indigenous 
inhabitants by European settlers (Bhandar 2018). It was this romanticised 
construction of nature as pristine wilderness or ‘edens’ that became the focal 
points of early 20th century environmental movements in the USA, Canada 
and Europe, in which white settlers were perceived as the only appropriate 
stewards of the ‘new frontier’ (Grove 1996, Hultgren 2015). In contrast, non- 
European and indigenous peoples were depicted as poor custodians of their 
own land or ‘savages’ in a state of arrested development and thus too close to 
nature and animals (Vergara-Figueroa 2018). John Locke, for example, 
legitimised the dispossession of indigenous people from the English colony 
of Virginia because they, unlike the English, didn’t appear to domesticate the 
land and render it more ‘productive’ (Bhandar 2018, p. 48–49). The cultiva-
tion of nature in ‘civilised’ Europe was contrasted with the untamed, raw, 
and destructive nature of the colonies; this served to racialise and masculinise 
environmental management and notions of stewardship (Grove 1996), even 
as the imperial capitalist projects of European empire relied on extractivism 
and ecological degradation (Parasram and Tilley 2018, p. 304).
It is within the milieu of imperial expansion, emergent conservationism, and 
rapid urbanisation that social Darwinian views of race and eugenics became 
highly influential. Eugenic fears over the reproduction of ‘inferior races’ were 
matched by an increasing preoccupation with Malthusian calculations regard-
ing population growth and natural resource depletion (Ehrlich 1968, Sani 
2018). This enabled environmental degradation and later climate change to 
be cast not as the result of industrialisation but overpopulation (Ehrlich 1968), 
which particularly took hold in North American environmental movements 
(Robertson 2012). This neo-Malthusianism combined with eugenic and 
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colonial racist logics, resulting in calls for population controls on peoples 
deemed less ‘worthy’ of reproduction. As Hultgren argues (Hultgren 2015):
The message being communicated by eugenic-minded greens was that non- 
white immigrants posed a biopolitical threat to national and natural purity and 
thus needed to be scrutinized, controlled, and—in some cases—deported 
through the use of sovereign power.
In Europe, these ideas were taken up by eco-fascists (Forchtner 2019b), who 
propagated the idea that indigenous ‘homelands’ were threatened by immi-
gration (often from ex-colonies). This established the environmental imagery 
utilised by far-right movements to boost political programmes (Olsen 1999), 
and was complemented by the eugenicist principles of Garrett Hardin’s (1968) 
‘Life Boat ethics’. With anti-immigrationism becoming a leitmotif of far-right 
electoral strategies in the late 20th and early 21st century, the environment has 
become increasingly viewed again as a rationale to justify immigration restric-
tions. This synthesis of eco-fascism and neo-Malthusian anxieties has resusci-
tated and remade many of these historical connections; bringing together 
nativist ideas of belonging and stewardship with the central facet of colonial 
racism, that Global South peoples are ‘inferior’ and do not have the same 
rights to land, custodianship, and resources.
Working with this history in mind, we argue that far-right European 
parties have assembled colonial and neo-Malthusian forms of knowledge in 
a relatively novel and cohesive (if variegated) discourse of ecobordering. 
Amidst ecological breakdown and the growing electoral salience of environ-
mental issues, far-right parties are forcefully articulating a ‘green’ case for 
insular political communities, anti-immigration, nationalism, and restrictive 
border regimes as mitigation strategies. But ecobordering has not emerged in 
a vacuum. Instead, it synthesises political practices and imaginaries with long 
lineages. Today, the reality of ‘fortress Europe’ is that those attempting to 
move from the Global South to Europe face highly restrictive visa regimes 
and border policies frequently contravening international law; resulting in 
the deaths of thousands of people crossing the Mediterranean every year (De 
Genova 2018). In this context, the far-right has been rejuvenated by anti- 
immigrationism (Mudde 2007), which liberal and left-of-centre parties and 
governments have often been complicit in legitimating, or apathetic in 
contesting (Valluvan 2019). The rise of anti-immigrationism, alongside the 
political salience of environmental catastrophe, has set the political condi-
tions for the contemporary ‘greenwashing’ of border violence.
Emergent ecobordering: conservation through borders
Outlining these assorted logics allows us to contextualise and historicise the 
construction of ecobordering. The emergent discourse of ecobordering 
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which we identify in our study of European far-right parties draws upon the 
aforementioned pre-existing logics of colonial, neo-Malthusian, and racia-
lised environmentalism in the context of rising environmental concern and 
a growing appetite for state action, in order to present migration as an 
‘environmental threat’ and securitised national and regional borders as 
‘solutions’. In this section, we empirically outline the variegated character 
of environmental discourses across the European far-right, disentangle the 
two distinctive strands of the ecobordering discourse, and analyse how these 
parties resuscitate and rework racialised logics of nature and environmental 
protection to justify and ‘naturalise’ border violence.
Our empirical research into the contemporary environmental discourses 
of EFRPs is documented in the below table. The manifestos, press releases, 
websites, speeches, interviews, blogs and election pamphlets of the 22 far- 
right parties (listed in the table) were examined, and translation software was 
used where English language versions where unavailable. The discourses are 
characterised in terms of four analytical categories: the denialism of ecolo-
gical degradation, the denialism of national or political responsibility for 
action on the environmental crisis, and two discernible forms of ecoborder-
ing that seek to blame either migrants or immigration for various forms of 
environmental degradation. The degree to which these four discourses were 
deployed in each party’s overall rhetoric and the consistency with which they 
were used differed significantly across parties and so classifications were 
given to denote discursive prominence. The classifications, in order of 
magnitude, were as follows: (1) strong, (2) intermediate and (3) limited. 
Environmental crisis denialism Ecobordering
Denial of 
evidence










Intermediate Strong Strong Limited
British National Party 
(UK)
Limited Limited Strong Strong
Conservative People’s 
Party (Estonia)
Strong Strong Limited Limited
Danish People’s Party 
(Denmark)
Intermediate Limited Limited Intermediate
ELAM (Cyprus) Intermediate Intermediate Limited Intermediate
Fidescz (Hungary) Limited Strong Limited Limited
Freedom & Direct 
Democracy (Czech 
Rep)
Intermediate Strong Limited Limited
Freedom Party 
(Austria)
Limited Strong Limited Intermediate
Freedom Party 
(Netherlands)
Strong Strong Limited Limited
(Continued)
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Environmental crisis denialism Ecobordering
Denial of 
evidence









Intermediate Intermediate Limited Strong
Greek Solution 
(Greece)
Limited Intermediate Limited Strong
Law and Justice Party 
(Poland)
Limited Intermediate Limited Intermediate
National Rally 
(France)
Limited Limited Strong Strong
Our Slovakia 
(Slovakia)
Limited Intermediate Limited Limited
Sweden Democrats 
(Sweden)
Limited Intermediate Limited Limited
Swiss People’s Party 
(Switzerland)
Intermediate Intermediate Strong Strong
The Finns Party 
(Finland)
Limited Strong Limited Intermediate
The League (Italy) Strong Strong Limited Intermediate
Vlaams Belang 
(Belgium)
Limited Strong Strong Limited




Intermediate Strong Strong Intermediate
United Patriots 
(Bulgaria)
Strong Strong Limited Limited
Denialism is, of course, traditionally associated with the far-right 
(Lockwood 2018, Schaller and Carius 2019), and it remains a prominent 
characteristic of EFRP rhetoric. This is particularly the case amongst the far- 
right parties of Eastern Europe, where denialism or neglect continue to be the 
prevailing discursive tendencies. However, several parties in Western Europe 
in particular turned to an alternative communicative strategy in the build up 
to the 2019 European Parliament elections, which displaced (although occa-
sionally co-existed with) discourses of denialism. Nine EFRPs demonstrated 
strong versions of what we term ecobordering, with a further six EFRPs 
displaying its logics in less prominent or consistent forms. These 15 parties, 
out of the 22 in our study, expressed at least one of the two distinctive 
rhetorical strains of ecobordering. Three EFPS strongly conveyed both of 
these rhetorical strains and, as such, can be considered the exemplars of 
ecobordering. These three parties are the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), the 
British National Party (BNP), and the National Rally in France.
The construction of ecobordering is thus geographically uneven. 
Iterations of the discourse were identified in the electioneering of Vox, 
Vlaams Belang, Alternativ für Deutschland and the United Kingdom 
Independence Party amongst other, and it is notable that National Rally 
and Golden Dawn have founded ‘green’ movements called ‘New Ecology’ 
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and ‘Green Wing’ respectively to enshrine nativist ideas of environmental 
protection (Schaller and Carius 2019, p. 83). Yet the discourse is most 
consistently and prominently utilised in the far-right parties of three 
Western European countries. With environmental issues becoming increas-
ingly prominent on the political agenda in certain European countries (and 
becoming particularly salient when appealing to younger voters), the incen-
tive to pivot to an alternative strategy which displays ‘green’ credentials in 
these areas is strong. The SVP and BNP now claim to have adopted an 
‘ideology-free’ approach to environmental protection which ‘exposes’ immi-
gration as the true danger to the environment (SVP [Swiss People’s Party] 
2019a, BNP 2019). The focus on mass immigration and migration renders 
them the only authentically ‘green’ political parties in their respective coun-
tries according to their campaign material. This represents a significant and 
rapid discursive shift on environmental issues in the European far-right 
movement.
Two expressions of the ecobordering discourse propagated by the 
European far-right are evident and require closer inspection. The first form 
of ecobordering highlights the impacts of migration on national environ-
mental resources and emphasises the link between immigration and popula-
tion growth, in order to stoke fears of depleting resources and the 
exacerbation of local environmental issues. The second depicts ‘the migrant’ 
as a culprit of environmental degradation, due to a negligence of the local 
environment owing, ostensibly, to a lack of knowledge, ‘belonging’, or 
(emotional or financial) ‘investment’ in the local area. This is juxtaposed 
by the representation of white Europeans, or what some RFPs refer to as 
‘natives’, as responsible custodians predisposed to the careful management of 
natural resources.
Migration as environmental plunder
The first expression of ecobordering – which we call migration as environ-
mental plunder – highlights the environmental impacts of migration from 
the Global South. In this imaginary, Global South migration is depleting 
scarce natural resources and exacerbating environmental degradation within 
Europe. As with previous neo-Malthusian narratives, the expansion of 
populations through migration represents the untenable plunder of national 
nature. This represents the politicisation of the environmental impacts of 
Global South migration and the simultaneous depoliticisation of the envir-
onmental impacts of ‘native’ Global North populations.
Links between ‘mass immigration’, ‘overpopulation, and environmental 
damage have been forged by numerous EFRPs. The BNP’s claim to be 
Britain’s ‘only true Green party’ rests on the neo-Malthusian logic they 
alone ‘recognise that overpopulation – whose primary driver is 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 9
immigration . . . is the cause of the destruction of our environment’ (BNP 
2019). The SVP’s (contestable) calculations that Switzerland’s one million 
migrants over 13 years had added 543,000 cars and 789 buses on the roads, 
9,000 million extra miles driven, increased power consumption of 2 billion 
kilowatt hours, 59 billion litres of water and the usage of 454,000 apart-
ments are disseminated to stoke neo-Malthusian fears of ‘mass migration’ 
resulting in the consumption or plunder of natural resource on a large 
scale (SVP [Swiss People’s Party] 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d). These 
claims remobilise longstanding colonial and eugenic-influenced ideas of 
overpopulation and environmental protection but are here linked to con-
temporary issues such as greenhouse gas emissions. There is also 
a professed fear, however, that migration will lead to an increased strain 
on finite natural resources and the threat posed to existing green spaces or 
agricultural land (UKIP 2019, AfD 2019), as well as undermine the 
cultural homogeneity upon which green action will depend (France24 
2019).
Vlaams Belang link ‘mass immigration’ to the excessive use of resources 
and energy consumption in order to argue that ‘an immigration stop is the 
best remedy for the further deterioration of our open spaces’ (VB 2019, 
p. 88). The SVP’s conclusion mirrors that of Vlaams Belang when they 
state that limiting immigration is needed to ‘curb overpopulation’, which is 
the ‘greatest environmental killer’ (SVP [Swiss People’s Party] 2019a, 2019b, 
2019d). The stark conclusion of the SVP’s 2019 manifesto is that ‘if you want 
to effectively protect the environment in Switzerland, you must fight mass 
immigration’ (SVP [Swiss People’s Party] 2019b). Through the narrow focus 
on overpopulation and immigration as the cause of environmental problems, 
the blame is shifted onto the movement and reproduction of racialised 
‘others’.
The youth wing of AfD have openly urged the party leadership to refrain 
from climate change denialism in order to adopt a comparable focus on the 
relationships between immigration, population growth, and ecological 
degradation (Eckert 2019). Cognisant of the importance of climate issues 
to younger generations of voters and the success of the German Greens, 
youth leaders of the AfD fear that a potential electoral advantage will be 
forfeited unless they present a ‘green’ message (Eckert 2019). The group later 
suggested the national AfD back a one-child policy in developing countries 
(Aronoff 2019), which reflected the Malthusian focus on Global South 
populations and their reproduction rather than Global North modes of 
production. In a similar vein, the AfD’s Rainer Kraft has accused Social 
Democratic and Green politicians of endangering the environment by ‘pro-
moting mass migration to Europe, even though the CO2 footprint of the 
average European is ten times that of someone from Africa’ (Ecowatch 2019). 
Here ‘Africa’ is used as a racialised proxy for all Global South migration; 
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stirring up colonial imaginaries of darkness and poverty and links this to 
environmental disaster.
This rendering of ecobordering tacitly accepts the significance of 
European lifestyles but ignores the specific economic drivers of ecological 
degradation, in order to accentuate and politicise the impacts of migration. 
The environmental crisis is framed as a problem of ‘the other’ seeking to 
enjoy the same carbon-intensive lifestyles as those in the Global North. 
Simultaneously, however, there is no explicit critique of unsustainable 
Global North lifestyles, which are tacitly accepted as suitable for ‘native’ 
populations’ and are thus actively depoliticised within this discourse. 
Through appealing to a racialised neo-Malthusian logic, immigration restric-
tions (in which mobility from the Global South is made highly visible) are 
rationalised as solutions to degradation. Meanwhile, this works to preserve 
the privileges of Global North populations (nationalised as ‘Swiss’, ‘British’, 
etc.) to continue to exploit and unsustainably consume natural resources. 
This reinforces the eugenicist and colonial rationale that certain populations 
are more legitimate and deserving holders of lifestyles that degrade the global 
commons. Here the threat to the natural world is not posed by Global North 
citizens but by the movement of ‘others’.
Migrant as environmental vandal
The second form of the ecobordering, which we call migrant as environ-
mental vandal, actively disparages the character of ‘migrants’. Racialised 
Global South migrants are cast as ‘uncivilised’ threats to the local environ-
ment due to their character. They are depicted as inherently incapable or 
unwilling to manage natural resources or protect the natural world. National 
citizens, in contrast, are cast as inherently responsible custodians or stewards 
of nature. Natives have, in this form of imaginary, long ensured the sound 
management and sustainability of the environment within national borders, 
until the commencement of mass immigration.
Key to operationalising this imagery is the importance of belonging to an 
area in the nativist imaginary, with European citizens depicted as ‘rooted’ 
and ‘invested’ in the local area and migrants depicted as ‘rootless’ and ‘un- 
invested’. Marine Le Pen of the National Rally in France made this brand of 
nativist environmentalism a key element of her rhetoric ahead of the 2019 
European Parliamentary elections (France24 2019). Le Pen argued: ‘envir-
onmentalism [is] the natural child of patriotism, because it’s the natural child 
of rootedness . . . if you’re a nomad, you’re not an environmentalist . . . Those 
who are nomadic . . . do not care about the environment; they have no 
homeland’ (cited in Adler 2019). Taking her lead from close ally and 
National Rally MEP Hervé Juvin (2019), who has long advocated ‘nationa-
listic green localism’, she claimed that concern for the immediate 
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environment is inherently national and that Global South migrants consti-
tute a threat to national homogeneity, belonging, and native custodianship.
The concepts of belonging and investment are used to conflate nativism 
with environmental protection here; an inherent connection between the 
land and the heritage of belonging, ownership and bloodline (Valluvan 
2019). The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) 2019 portrays their voters as 
unassuming cultivators and custodians of natural beauty in their ‘homeland’, 
which can be traced back to ‘ancient civilisations’. Meanwhile, the SVP take 
great pride in claim it ‘is not the party of environmental theorists, but the 
party of environmental practitioners; the farmer, the forester, the tradesman. 
You do not have to tell them about the careful use of natural resources’ (SVP 
[Swiss People’s Party] 2019a). Santiago Abascal proclaimed the green cre-
dentials of Vox by declaring an intention to ‘sensibly protect the environ-
ment’, which amounted to ‘protecting the rural community and farmers, 
who are the real people who take care of the natural environment. To defend 
our culture, our traditions and our roots’ (Vox 2019). Here the ‘true’ nation 
is presented in rural communities and farmers, which are imagined to be free 
of migration and multiculturalism that ‘blemish’ urban spaces (although in 
reality agriculture in much of Europe relies heavily on the exploitation of 
migrant labour). In this way, far-right parties address, and present, their 
constituents as the superior protectors of European nature. They posit that 
belonging to an area is a vital component of effective environmental steward-
ship, and that belonging is shaped by racialised and patriarchal imaginaries 
of the ‘farmer’ or ‘forester’ figure, akin to Burke’s ‘little platoons’.
This serves to fetishise ‘ancient’ connections of blood and soil in ways 
which echo eco-fascist notions of environmentalism. This remains evident in 
Golden Dawn’s assertion that ‘the environment is the cradle of our race, it 
mirrors our culture and civilisation, and it is therefore our duty to protect it’ 
(Golden Dawn 2020). ‘Blood and soil’ imagery can be seen even more 
explicitly in the infamous white supremacist Richard Spencer’s manifesto 
inaugurating the 2017 ‘Unite the Right’ rally (Forchtner 2019b). This links to, 
and takes inspiration from, many of the conservative and eco-fascist debates 
in the US in the 1960s, but is renewed by the anti-immigrationism that 
saturates European politics and presents migration as a threat to culture, 
‘social cohesion’, and national security (Baldwin 2013).
This focus on ‘natives as custodians’ relies on a naturalised hierarchy of 
belonging reflective of colonial logics of European white supremacy. An 
aptitude for sustainably managing nature (or ‘homeland’) is supposedly an 
inherent feature of ‘native’ Europeans, whether that be due to tireless pas-
toral labour, a superior sense of consideration, or the superior regulations 
limiting industrial emissions (Danish People’s Party 2019, Freedom Party of 
Austria [FPÖ] 2019, Vox 2019, The Finns Party 2019, SVP [Swiss People’s 
Party] 2019a). This corollary is that natives bear no responsibility for 
12 J. TURNER AND D. BAILEY
ecological degradation; indeed, they are unequivocally committed to their 
defending and cultivating their ‘roots’. In contrast, Global South migrants are 
viewed as uncivilised, irresponsible, reckless or un-invested in the local area. 
As such, they are understood to be active threats to conservation efforts. As 
a result, regions with high levels of immigration are supposedly more likely 
to experience a range of local environmental issues, including littering, 
animal cruelty or killing protected species, illegal settlements in green spaces, 
forest fires, over-fishing, the loss of ‘indigenous’ plants, and the destruction 
of ‘national beauty’ (Golden Dawn 2020, The Sun 2016, Greek Solution 2019, 
Vox 2019, BNP 2019). The parallels with how (former) colonised peoples are 
depicted as ‘dirty’ and ‘uncivilised’ (McClintock 1995), irrevocable threats 
due to the inability to assimilate to national ‘cultural practices’, helps render 
this imagery intelligible. Racialised metaphors of migrants from the Global 
South as an invasive ‘species’ (‘hordes’ or ‘swarms’), used by EFRPs and 
tabloid newspapers alike (Jones 2015, BBC 2015), accentuate the sense of 
imminent environmental danger.
Migrant camps, such as the ‘Calais Jungle’, are frequently weaponised by 
the far-right to insinuate that migrants are a threat to nature, through 
presenting a misleading binary framing of a harmonious and sustainable 
environment ‘before’ followed by squalor ‘after’ (Jolly 2018). The French far- 
right movement present informal migrant camps in Northern France as an 
environmental catastrophe, focussing on the prevalence of tents and mat-
tresses, litter, trampled crops, and traffic volumes as the transformation of 
‘Europe’s cultural centre’ into a ‘third world migrant jungle’ (BBC 2016, 
Voice of Europe 2018). Calls to turn existing migrant camps into ‘environ-
mental protection’ areas, which would legally facilitate the expulsion of 
migrants from the land, have followed these claims. To reinforce this binary 
between migrants and nature in the minds of voters, the National Rally have 
begun transforming Hénin-Beaumont into a ‘sustainable city’, mimicking 
acclaimed Green Party initiatives in Loos-en-Gohelle and Grande-Synthe 
(Onishi 2019). These appeals to conservation tend to both dehumanise 
migrants as ‘litter’ and aid their racialised expulsion through restrictive 
immigration policies, violent policing methods, and deportation (Dhesi 
et al. 2018).
In this way, the language of responsible stewardship, which was so central 
to settler colonial projects, is deployed to justify virulent anti- 
immigrationism. Just as colonised peoples were presented as ‘poor stewards’ 
of their lands to justify conquest in the 17th century and in imperial projects 
of conservation in the 19th century, ecobordering constructs a looming threat 
to European nature posed by an influx of migrants. Both forms of ecobor-
dering explored above (plunder and vandalism) imply an irreconcilable 
conflict between human mobility and environmental protection. This 
marks an important shift in terms of how EFRPs are mobilising long- 
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standing ideas, but with a greater emphasis on the contemporary ‘domestic’ 
environmental risks of immigration in which Global South migration is 
made hyper-visible. Immigration purportedly threatens to disrupt the 
sound and previously sustainable management of nature by native popula-
tions (Valluvan 2019, p. 100–101). Conservation in these terms becomes the 
bedfellow of anti-immigration policies, restrictive and violent border poli-
cies. Exclusionary border policies are presented as a strategy of conservation; 
impeding the plunder and vandalism of nature. Whilst purporting to be 
about protecting nature, the schema justifies violent border practices that in 
the context of the European migrant crisis are largely focussed on people 
moving from the Middle East, North and Sub-Saharan Africa, at the same 
time as it feeds nationalist claims to superior ‘civilisation’.
These ideas are variegated across the nations and regions of Europe and 
fed through localised struggles and ethno-nationalist projects, but they share 
broadly familiar logics. Whilst the discourse of ecobordering is tied to the 
histories of colonialism, conservative environmentalism, and eco-fascism, 
what we also reveal is that rather than merely part of the wider milieu of far- 
right ideology, environmentalism has become a more explicit rationale of 
border and anti-immigration restrictions. One key change is that the figure 
of the Global South migrant is not only treated as an ‘inferior’ custodian of 
nature, but an explicit threat to European ecologies (or what some parties 
refer to as ‘homeland’). The broad discursive shift towards ecobordering 
threatens to alter perceptions of environmental degradation and ‘greenwash’ 
violent forms of statecraft centring on border control.
Camouflaging capitalism: disguising the engines of ecological 
degradation
The economic dynamics ignored, and thus obscured, by the ecobordering 
discourse are just as important as the imaginaries revived. It is important to 
note that the ecobordering framing of ecological degradation entirely fails to 
locate its primary causes in capitalist systems of production and consump-
tion that span the global economy (Newell and Paterson 2010, Koch 2012, 
Newell 2013, Moore 2016). It is these systems of production and consump-
tion that generate high levels of greenhouse gas emissions and/or require the 
continual extraction of natural resources, whilst simultaneously reproducing 
inequalities between Global North and South.
The causal link between industrialisation and the rise of global greenhouse 
gases can be traced back as far as the industrial revolution (Jarvis et al. 2012). 
The primary industry culpable for greenhouse gas emissions and climate 
change is the fossil fuel industry, with one study claiming that 70% of global 
emissions since 1988 can be traced back to the extraction and commodifica-
tion of fossil fuel energy by only 100 companies (Carbon Disclosure Project 
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2017). Complicit in generating these emissions, however, are the other 
industries dependent upon cheap energy for production practices (including 
the aviation and automotive industries) and the public policies enabling or 
facilitating this production. A series of other pressing environmental issues 
also have their roots in various practices of production and consumption in 
the global economy, including deforestation, air and water pollution, ocean 
acidification, and biodiversity loss, which are strongly linked to the opera-
tions of construction, agriculture, mining, and chemical industries (Newell 
2013, Klein 2014, Moore 2016). Progress on tackling the ecological crisis has 
proven to be so elusive largely because the short-term profitability that 
accompanies extractive capitalism has been consistently prioritised (politi-
cally and culturally) over the protection of ‘the global commons’ in the 
Global North (Brand and Wissen 2012). This is manifest, for example, in 
governments shielding business practices from burdensome environmental 
regulations, subsidising companies responsible for ecological degradation, 
and financing the infrastructure which further facilitates environmentally 
deleterious forms of economic growth. These patterns of production, 
finance, trade, and policy, and who profits from them, are key to under-
standing the ecological crisis.
The ecobordering diagnosis of the ecological crisis entirely disregards this 
structural relationship between the ecological crisis and the operations of the 
global economy. In neglecting this relationship, ecobordering serves to 
‘camouflage’ capitalism in an attempt to politically sustain the economic 
status quo; a de facto concealment and defence of Global North economies, 
whose wealth was accumulated through the violence of colonialism, this is 
sustained by artificial illusions to nature and the spectre of militarised 
protection if necessary.
The proponents of ecobordering seek to obscure and politically sustain 
the economic status quo in a context of grotesquely uneven distributions of 
capital accumulation and ecological risk. Oxfam’s calculations show that the 
poorest half of the global population are only responsible for 10% of annual 
GHGs, with the richest 10% responsible for 50% (Oxfam 2015). Yet it is those 
in the Global North who benefit most from the global economy that are least 
exposed to ecological degradation, whilst the populations that remain per-
ipheralised in the global economy are set to be the geo-political inheritors of 
displaced ecological risk. This is compounded by the knowledge that the 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of the global economy are structural legacies of 
European colonialism and industrialisation, made possible by resource 
extraction, dispossession, slavery, exploitation, and dispossession of colo-
nised people (Blackburn 2011, Sealey-Huggins 2017)
Existing imperial global power relations continue to structure political 
apathy to and policy inaction on climate issues in the Global North. As 
Ghosh notes, the close relation between differentials of power and GHGs 
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should lead us to conclude that ‘the distribution of power . . . lies at the core 
of the climate crisis’ (Ghosh 2016, p. 146). The relations of production – 
often imposed by force on countries during the colonial period – have 
resulted not only in expropriation, extractivism, and plunder (Robinson 
1983), but also in the production of – and the exposure of the Global 
South to – the extreme risks presented by this century’s climate crisis 
(Oxfam 2015, Piketty and Chancel 2015). This geo-political division of 
financial enrichment and ecological risk represents a double injustice.
These global injustices would only be compounded by what ecobordering 
seeks to rationalise; the imposition of climate apartheid. The racialised 
interpretation of the Anthropocene framing of the ecological crisis disin-
genuously places Global South migration, rather than extractivist capitalism, 
at the centre of the crisis. Eschewing structural causes of degradation, both 
‘migrant as vandal’ and ‘migration as plunder’ variants of ecobordering seek 
to justify border securitisation in order to contain and restrict Global South 
migration at a time of heightening ecological risk that is likely to cause and 
necessitate more human mobility.
The recognition of economic–ecological relationships belies the racialised 
neo-Malthusian supposition that migration drives environmental depletion 
via supporting population growth (Moore 2016). The corollary of empirical 
political economy analyses of ecological degradation is that we require 
a contemplation of the economic transformations necessary to preserve the 
natural world, and the forms of statecraft which can help steer these eco-
nomic transformations in the context of colonial legacies of dispossession 
and global inequalities of wealth (Scoones et al. 2015, Sealey-Huggins 2017, 
Parasram and Tilley 2018, Klein 2019, Bailey 2020, 2021). Crucially, if the 
ecological crisis is to be successfully mitigated then this will only be achieved 
through policies that target the very same economic and societal actors, 
which ecobordering seeks to insulate from criticism. As such, the exponents 
of ecobordering offer no genuine programme of mitigation but works to 
conceal alternatives and shield already privileged populations from the 
ravages of the crisis.
Through disingenuously framing borders as climate solutions, ecoborder-
ing serves as a justification for the further securitisation of regional, national, 
and private property borders. They do so despite borders constituting sig-
nificant political barriers to the provision of refuge to climate migrants 
fleeing decreasingly habitable regions and the transformation of the indus-
tries propelling numerous forms of degradation (Baldwin 2013). The ima-
gery of local custodians sustaining local areas may resonate with privileged 
Global North electorates, but its veracity as a route to conservation is belied 
by the ways in which territorial borders are being utilised by states, corpora-
tions, and landholders to exacerbate degradation, and the violence those 
borders enact on people moving for refuge, asylum, or better life chances.
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Conclusion
An empirical analysis of 22 EFRPs reveals an emergent and distinctive 
discourse we have conceptualised as ecobordering. Whilst denialism pre-
viously dominated the environmental discourses of European far-right poli-
tical parties, ecobordering responds to the rising environmental concerns of 
European electorates by engendering fears about the supposedly active threat 
of immigration to previously ‘pure’ and ‘sustainable’ spaces of national 
nature, and thus presents borders as forms of environmental protection. 
Through normalising ethno-nationalist, neo-Malthusian, and eco-fascist 
logics, this emerging electoral strategy directs attention away from the 
systemic and socio-economic drivers of contemporary ecological degrada-
tion and channels anxieties into anti-immigrationism. As a corollary, it 
prescribes a form of statecraft concentrated on border security rather than 
systemic economic transformation; an apocryphal programme of environ-
mental protection.
Furthermore, ecobordering mendaciously seeks to diagnose the symptoms 
of ecological degradation as cause. The depiction of border securitisation as 
forms of environmental protection emerges at a time when immigration is 
rising because of climate change. The injustice of this de facto attempt to 
rationalise ‘climate apartheid’ is only compounded by the systematic exploi-
tation of the Global South’s natural resources and labour in the global 
economy which has primarily benefitted Global North populations and 
brought the planet to the point of ecological collapse. Ecobordering thus 
ultimately threatens to rationalise the duality of Global North populations 
enjoying the spoils of an environmentally deleterious global economy whilst 
poorer populations, predominantly but not solely in the Global South, 
become restricted to precarious livelihoods in decreasingly inhabitable areas.
The potential electoral potency of fusing border security and climate 
issues – however fallaciously – underlines the importance of academic 
engagement with ecobordering. The concept extends our understandings 
of contemporary environmental politics in Europe, postcolonial approaches 
to borders, and the politics of the ascendant far-right. Further research is 
needed on the evolution and adoption of ecobordering, its influence on 
public understandings of potential policy responses, the underlying motiva-
tions of its exponents, and the statecraft it successfully rationalises.
Notes
1. We draw our definition of far-right parties from Forchtner (2019a) who argues 
that the far-right is defined by ‘linking membership in the nation to biological/ 
racial and/or cultural traits’ as well as varying tendencies toward ‘ethnoplur-
alism, anti-socialism, proclivity for scapegoating “others”, and an uncritical 
view on the community’s historical past’ (Forchtner 2019a, p. 3). The 22 far- 
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right parties in this study have varied political histories and issues of contesta-
tion, and are situated in nations with varied economic circumstances, political 
systems, linguistic tendencies, and environmental issues. However, they share 
the aforementioned political attributes whilst occupying analogous political 
positions in the EU legislature.
2. Iterations of this discourse may also be found disseminated by political parties 
(and indeed by social media accounts) from elsewhere on the political spec-
trum or planet. As Hultgren (2015) notes, the contemporary fusion of envir-
onmentalism, anti-immigrationism, and far-right politics should not be 
thought of as an aberration of an otherwise ‘progressive’ environmental move-
ment, but instead emerges out of a historical construction of nature which is 
already deeply classed, gendered, and racialised.
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